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How can the chosen words “philosophy” and
“poetry” ever attain true harmony? Intent on one
disciplined desire you stare longingly at qualities
acting and being acted on in another . . .
—Susan Howe, “Vagrancy in the Park”
1 A novice reader who develops an interest in the critical framing of Wallace Stevens’s
poetry by a representative sample of scholarly experts is likely to turn today to at least
one of two critical sources, The Cambridge Companion to Wallace Stevens and/or Wallace
Stevens in Context. Among the more striking features of these two volumes is the critical
place they afford to questions of philosophy: the former contains a synthetic chapter
on “Stevens and Philosophy” (Eeckhout, 2007), while the latter divides the attention
between  chapters  on  “American  Philosophy”  (Malkin,  2017)  and  “European
Philosophy”  (Ziarek,  2017).  For  a  special  issue  such  as  this,  it  may  thus  be  worth
investigating a number of responses that the philosophical qualities of Stevens’s work
have continued to elicit in recent years.
2 What follows is a critical presentation of a handful of twenty-first-century published
responses  to  Stevens’s  poetry  in  relation  to  philosophy.  To  ensure  that  this  effort
remains sufficiently distinct from the aforementioned chapters (the first  of  which I
have authored myself), the essay will play off two types of response against each other:
by five fellow poets, on the one hand, and by two philosophers, on the other. These two
opposed  angles  seem  interesting  to  me  precisely  insofar  as  they  fall  outside
mainstream writings on the poet as produced by literary critics.1 I want to focus on
them here as a literary-sociological  exercise and a form of applied reader response
theory. This means that the following article is not primarily concerned with reading
Stevens’s poetry, producing new insight into its philosophical allure, or proposing a
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personal theory about the relation between poetry and philosophy. It also means that
several famous voices have been consciously left out of the discussion. On the poetic
side, this is the case with a number of major contemporary poets such as Susan Howe
and  Cole  Swensen.  While  Howe  and  Swensen  have  composed  some  of  their  most
inspired poetry and prose in response to Stevens’s work, these writings have addressed
the  poet’s  relation  to  philosophy  only  indirectly  and  fleetingly  at  best.2 On  the
philosophical side, I  have excluded the cases of Stanley Cavell  and Simon Critchley,
both of whom are commonly cited and discussed in Stevens criticism. Instead, I will
turn to the only two other philosophers I am aware of as potential twenty-first-century
case studies.  The essays by Alain Badiou and Peter  Hare presented below have not
received any attention among Stevens scholars.
3 Thus,  the  current  article  introduces  a  range  of  voices  that  are  almost  entirely
unfamiliar to Stevens critics, and are themselves, in turn, barely influenced by such
criticism. The categorical distinction among poets, philosophers, and critics on which I
fall back here is hardly waterproof, of course, yet it will turn out to have at least some
heuristic value. What happens when these five fellow poets, on the one hand, and two
philosophers, on the other, weigh in on Stevens’s work without laying claim to any
academic expertise  on the poet?  How do they negotiate  the difficulties  of  bringing
together poetry and philosophy?
 
Five Poets Reflecting on the Philosophical Nature of
Stevens’s Writings
4 For  a  minimally  diverse sample  of  contemporary  American  poets’  responses  to
Stevens’s  philosophical  appeal,  we  may  conveniently  turn  to  David  Baker,  Linda
Gregerson, Carl Phillips, Stanley Plumly, and Carol Frost. Together these poets filled a
section in the New England Review in 2016 under the title “The Mind at the End of the
Palm: Wallace Stevens Thinking.”3 Not unusually for American poets, the five writers
all  teach  at  a  college  or  university,  and  are  thus  presented  as  belonging  to  the
professional hybrid of “poet-critics.”4 Yet they are not established Stevens critics; they
belong to the many fellow poets who gravitate toward Stevens’s work without being
academic experts on it. What these writers predominantly publish are books of poetry
and non-scholarly essays rather than academic criticism. One of them is also a poetry
editor (Baker), another directs a writers’ program (Gregerson). The NER, in addition,
calls itself a literary magazine, not a scholarly journal, and four of the essays came out
of a panel organized during the annual conference of the Association of Writers and
Writers  Programs.  The poets’  five brief  essays,  finally,  are personal  reflections that
come  without  notes  or  bibliographies.  How  does  such  a  sample  of  contemporary
American  poets  come  to  terms  with  the  question  of  Stevens’s  philosophical
importance?
5 Although there is no immediate need to stick to the essays’ sequence of publication,
David Baker’s opening contribution is worth looking at first and in most detail, not only
because it is meant to introduce the cluster of reflections but also because of how it
does so. Baker starts by asserting what is largely an established opinion—that “Wallace
Stevens is one of our supreme knowers, one of the profound thinkers of, and inside, the
lyric poem.” Yet he quickly admits to being at a loss about how to deal with Stevens’s
formidable reputation as a “philosophical poet” (2016 24). He is happy to praise the
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poet’s collection of aphorisms for their “great baffling clarities, those one- and two-
sentence zingers of which Americans are so fond,” but struggles with the fact that in
those aphorisms, and in the poetry, “Stevens says almost everything,” so much so that
“his work can be made to fit [and] to prove […] almost every [philosophical] stance”
imaginable.  This  leads  Baker  to  propose  that  “Stevens  is  one  of  the  great  lyric
chameleons” in American poetry, but also to wonder to himself, “Is he a philosopher?”
(2016 25)
6 That is obviously a tricky question for a poet to answer, not only because it sounds so
essentialist but also because poets may feel institutionally ill-placed to decide on who
counts as a philosopher. Having asked the question, nevertheless, Baker comes up with
a remarkable solution: he suspends his own judgement and surrenders to the territorial
logic  of  academic  disciplines.  Instead of  proposing  a  tentative  personal  answer,  he
starts  by  putting  the  question  to  “three  poetry  friends,  who  by  profession  are
philosophers.” The first of these, Troy Jollimore, happens to be an analytic philosopher.
In my chapter on “Stevens and Philosophy” published over ten years ago, I  already
speculated  on  the  fundamental  mismatch  there  seems  to  be  between  Stevens’s
interests,  or  ways  of  thinking,  and  those  that  have  become  hegemonic  in  Anglo-
American  philosophy  departments  today,  with  their  widespread  focus  on  analytic
philosophy (Eeckhout, 2007 106; see also Han, 2019 162-69). These speculations are now
anecdotally confirmed by Baker’s  experiment:  at  his  request,  Jollimore tries to give
some  deep  thought  to  the  question  of  Stevens’s  status as  a  philosopher,  and  then
concludes she has very little to say on the matter (2016 25).
7 The second philosopher contacted by Baker  proves  less  willing to  comply with the
synthetic claims I put forward in my contribution to The Cambridge Companion to Wallace
Stevens.  At  the  time,  I  proposed  that  Stevens’s  poetry  accommodates  philosophical
appropriations in the Continental European tradition much more readily than in the
Anglo-American analytic one. Yet despite her own training in Continental philosophy,
Kascha Semonovich resists  a  critical  approximation:  she personally does not “think
philosophy  and  poetry  are  terribly  similar,”  and  sees  especially  a  “significant”
difference  “between  sustained  analysis  and  mere  ‘philosophical  moments.’”
Semonovich deplores, in particular, the lack of a “system” of justification in Stevens’s
poetry, and “without justification you just have beliefs” (2016 25). Her objection thus
exemplifies  one  of  the  most  recurrent  obstacles  to  a  productive  rapprochement
between  poetry  and  philosophy:  the  philosopher’s  common  demand  for  systematic
reasoning.  Stevens,  we  might  remind  ourselves,  was  fully  capable  of  systematic
reasoning because it informed his daytime job as one of the country’s most respected
lawyers in the insurance business. But he was also adamant about the need for poetry
to  avoid  all  forms  of  intellectual  containment,  let  alone  any  systematic  search  for
insight.  In  one  of  his  published letters,  he  notes,  “I  have  never  studied  systematic
philosophy and should be bored to death at the mere thought of doing so” (Stevens,
1996 636). In another, he explains that “It is difficult for a man whose whole life is
thought to continue as a poet. The reason (like the law, which is only a form of the
reason)  is  a  jealous  mistress”  (Stevens,  1996 761).  And in  one of  his  aphorisms,  he
provocatively proposes, “Perhaps it is of more value to infuriate philosophers than to
go along with them” (Stevens, 1997 906).
8 Baker’s genial attempt at restoring the dialogue between philosophers and poets thus
seems  destined  to  revive  some  of  the  ancient  antagonisms  and  mutual
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misunderstandings between the two kinds of writer, and to be leading only to further
territorial retrenchment. Fortunately for his experiment, however, there is still John
Koethe as his third sparring partner.  Koethe proves to be a much more welcoming
interlocutor: not only is he both an established poet and an established philosopher, he
once even contributed a brief reflection to The Wallace Stevens Journal. Against his two
distancing colleagues, Koethe seeks to cast a bridge between poetry and philosophy by
following one of Stevens’s own ideas—that we should distinguish “between systematic
thinking and ‘the movements of consciousness.’” We might take an interest in Stevens’s
poetry,  Koethe  proposes,  to  the  extent  that  we  are  able  to  share  the  poet’s
“dissatisfaction  in  the  very  system  of  intellectual  construction  that  defines  both
philosophy  and  the  logical  or  reasonable  rhetoric  of  legal  argument  out  of  which
Stevens’s  very  day-job  derives”  (2016  25;  Baker’s  paraphrase).  To  Koethe,  Stevens’s
value as a poetic thinker lies exactly in his resistance to system-building and his agile
ways of tracing the movements of consciousness. This argument is very similar, we will
see, to the pragmatist argument by Peter Hare.
9 From his conversation with philosophers Baker concludes that poetry almost never
“does” philosophy, and that we should ask different questions of it instead. For the
remainder  of  his  essay,  he  then  proposes  to  look  at  “three  kinds  of  rhetorical
paradigms in Stevens’s poetry, none of them ultimately ‘doing’ philosophy.” (2016 26)
He chooses to return, in other words, to poetically familiar terrain, which we might call
that of rhetorical modes. He starts by considering those “crystalline” poems by Stevens
that  love  to  “suggest—and  to  parody—a  kind  of  methodology”  which  is  really  a
“pastiche  of  [the]  process”  of  reasoning  (2016  26).  Such  mimicry  of  reasoning,  he
argues,  only  seems like  philosophy;  in  reality,  it  acts  as  “a  tautology  of  the
indecipherable.” (2016 27) Second, in the work after Harmonium (1923) Stevens builds
out  to  the  “more  rhetorically  sustained […]  speculative  poem” that  perhaps  comes
“closest to philosophy.” Yet in Baker’s opinion, the “finest poems” are those in which
Stevens  “is  most  truly  a  meditative  poet.”  (2016  27)  Agreeing  with  Roger  Gilbert’s
classic study of the “walking poem” in modern American literature, Baker describes
these  poems as  instances  where “to  meditate  is to  amble” (2016 27).  He takes  “An
Ordinary Evening in New Haven” as an example, describing it by saying, “It’s as much
music as method, and more amusement than analysis.” This allows Baker to reach his
personal  conclusion:  to  him,  Stevens  “feel[s]  by  thinking”  in  his  poetry.  “Thinking
makes him nearly ecstatic” (2016 28).
10 There is no need to cover the other poets’ essays in similar detail. What matters to this
bird’s-eye view, after all, are recurrent patterns. And the first general observation to be
made  is  that  all  five  poets  conspicuously  evade  the  question  of philosophy  as
philosophy.  Without  exception,  what  they prefer  to  look at  are  Stevens’s  idiomatic
ways  of  lyric  thinking,  unconnected  to  any  names  or  theories  from the  history  of
philosophy.  Apparently sharing Baker’s  initiating skepticism about whether Stevens
might be regarded as a philosopher in his own right, they are satisfied to reflect on
Stevens’s poems as sensitive close readers. The most probing essay in this regard is,
arguably, Carl Phillips’s “Thinking Versus Imagination.” Phillips’s contribution takes
off  from the opening aphorism of  Stevens’s  poem “Crude Foyer”:  “Thought is  false
happiness” (Stevens, 1997 270). After a few preliminary hypotheses about how Stevens
likely identifies the notion of “thought” in this instance with a tendency toward literal
rather  than  figurative  thinking,  as  well  as  with  a  search  for  the  satisfactions  of
intellectual  closure,  Phillips  modestly  notes that  he does not  really  have “any firm
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theories about Stevens’ poems.” Instead, he prefers to embark on an analysis of what
might be called the formal enactment of modes of thinking in Stevens. He reminds us,
on the basis of concrete passages, how Stevens’s “expansion of sentence length,” with
its  “accompanying  increase  in  syntactic  complexity  and  […]  intensification  of
repetition,” works as a way “to enact […] a restlessness of mind” (2016 34). He further
interprets  examples of  ellipsis  and stanza break,  the ghostly presence of  a  volta in
many  of  the  poems,  Stevens’s  use  of  anaphora  and  chiasmus,  of  enjambment  and
caesura  (2016  35-37).  A  subtle  discussion  of  these  poetic  features  persuasively
demonstrates how poetic form can be used to dramatize thinking, and how exactly
Stevens uses such tools to distill  lyric verse out of his meditating mind. But it  also
implicitly  refuses  to  take the measure of  Stevens’s  larger  philosophical  import  and
place, which evaporate as possible questions to ask of his work.
11 The same approach,  centered on a  detailed consideration of  the formal  features  of
specific poems, recurs throughout, and it ultimately renders these five poets’ pursuits
more Vendlerian—i.e., composed in the spirit of Helen Vendler’s aesthetically oriented
criticism  on  Stevens—than  philosophical.  Linda  Gregerson’s  investigation  of  “The
‘Predicate of Substance’” still  has most philosophical heft  in tracing what she calls,
alternatively, “an irreducible oxymoron” or “an aporia” in Stevens’s work (2016 31).
But it, too, in the end, is about her coming to terms with a handful of passages from
“The Auroras of Autumn.” The textual connections she establishes in passing are with
John  Milton  and  George  Puttenham  (2016  30,  31),  not  with  any  theoretical  or
philosophical thinkers. For Stanley Plumly as well, the intertextual focus is on other
poets  thinking—predominantly  John  Keats  and  T.S.  Eliot—not  on  any  philosophical
intertexts. Most characteristically, perhaps, Carol Frost zooms in on Stevens’s use of
the poetic  imperative,  and demonstrates—quite convincingly for those who take an
interest  in  the  matter—that  there  is  an  as  yet  unidentified  poetic  subtext  to  “The
Emperor of Ice-Cream”: the Jacobean playwright John Webster’s dirge (included in his
play The White Devil) “Call for the Robin-Redbreast” (2016 44-46).
12 There is no doubt, then, that these personal reflections and readings of Stevens’s work
are sensitive,  subtle,  and composed in a  collaborative spirit  that  seeks to draw out
affinities between philosophical thinking and lyric writing. But it is equally clear how
circumspect and oblique they tend to be, how little inclined to address the question of
Stevens’s philosophical qualities head on. Their implied audience seems to be that of
other  poets,  not  of  philosophers  or  of  literary  theorists  wishing  to  establish  a
productive  encounter  between  the  two  kinds  of  writing.  From  a  sociological
perspective,  then,  what  is  most  striking  about  these  responses  to  the  question  of
Stevens’s  philosophical  importance  is  how  much  the  five  poets  appear  to  be
intimidated by it—whether this is due to the formidable reputation of Stevens’s poetry,
their  own experiences  with  it  as  readers,  the  status  of  philosophy  as  an  academic
discipline, the jargon and scope of literary theory, or any combination of such factors.
 
Philosophers’ Reflections: The Case of Alain Badiou
13 As  we  saw  in  the  introduction,  an  exhaustive  overview  of  twenty-first-century
philosophers  responding  to  Stevens’s  work  would  have  to  include  figures  such  as
Stanley Cavell and Simon Critchley. But both of these thinkers have already received
considerable  attention  in  Stevens  criticism,  unlike  the  two  philosophers  presented
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here, Alain Badiou and Peter Hare. Narratively, it makes most sense to organize this
part of my survey from East to West, starting in France and moving back to the U.S. In
rudimentary  terms,  this  entails  a  movement  from  the  post-Marxist  and  post-1968
French thinking of Badiou to the tradition of American pragmatism reaching back to
Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. Let us note, as a further preamble, that the
two  philosophers’  references  to  Stevens  are  explicitly  testimonies  of  affinity  and
affiliation.  Indeed,  no  philosopher  would  feel  the  urge  to  engage  with  Stevens’s
challenging Modernist verse out of sheer animosity: the poet’s symbolic capital and
sociopolitical importance outside the niche of poetry readers is too limited for that.
14 Sometime in the early 2000s (the published offshoot mentions no precise date), Badiou
gave a talk under the title “Le dessin.” It remained unpublished as such in French, but
appeared in English translation in 2006 as  “Drawing:  On Wallace Stevens,”  and has
since been included in a collection of Badiou’s essays published by Verso in 2014, The
Age of the Poets and Other Writings on Twentieth-Century Poetry and Prose. Although there is
a colon between the main title of the translation and its subtitle, the striking ambiguity
in English invites us also to omit the colon and wonder how Badiou draws on Stevens in
this essay. As soon as we do so, the shift from the poets considered in the previous
section is immediately apparent: for his part, Badiou does not appear to be interested
in analyzing the formal and aesthetic strategies of Stevens’s poetry. Rather, he mines
the American’s writings, inspirationally but to some extent also just instrumentally, to
help him address a larger philosophical question that preoccupies him. The aim of his
article, as he defines it at the outset, is to “propose a very general definition of the arts,
more  precisely  of  contemporary  arts,”  and  then  to  offer  “a  short  definition  of
drawing.”  Understandably,  this  makes  him  turn  to  Stevens’s  poem  “Description
Without Place,” which has long acted as a magnet on theoretically minded readers—we
will see it coming back later. To start off his reflection, Badiou borrows the arresting
title of Stevens’s poem to define what to him “every work of art, especially every work
in contemporary arts,” amounts to—descriptions without place—although he does not
tell the reader in advance that it will be necessary to activate different meanings of
“without place” at different points in his text. In the case of an art installation, for
instance, Badiou seems to be interested primarily in the subversive re-placement of
things so that they wind up “outside their normal place,” whereas in the case of a
performance his interest appears to be more in possibilities for ecstatic description
through which we enter “a space that is strictly speaking outside itself” (2014 75).
15 To  define  the  art  of  drawing,  Badiou  inflects  Stevens’s  phrase  still  differently.  “A
drawing,” he argues, “is a complex of marks,” and “These marks have no place” (2014
75).  This  is  the  case  because  the  marks, as  soon as  they are  inscribed,  “create  the
background as  an  open space.  They  create  what  Mallarmé names  ‘the  blank paper
guarded by its  white’”  (2014 76).  The reference to Mallarmé is  no coincidence:  the
father of French Symbolism has long been a major source of inspiration for Badiou’s
thinking about literature, and he recurs plentifully throughout The Age of the Poets. In
general,  Mallarmé’s  inspirational  value seems to  be the result  of  Badiou’s  longtime
interest in the autonomy of the artwork. Yet it  may also say something about how
Badiou situates Stevens for himself—as a writer who stands in this Symbolist tradition
and does not belong, for instance, with the poets discussed elsewhere in the volume
under “Poetry and Communism.”
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16 Having proposed his tentative definitions, Badiou interrupts his own system-building.
“Fortunately,” he observes, “one point in the poem of Wallace Stevens surprises me”
(2014 76).  That phrase—“one point in the poem”—might be expected to refer to an
actual passage in the text for any of the five poets just mentioned, but for Badiou the
point is an idea, not a textual crux. He cites Stevens’s opening lines from “Description
Without  Place”:  “It  is  possible  that  to  seem—it  is  to  be,  /  As  the sun is  something
seeming and it is” (Stevens, 1997 296). This notion of the “inseparability of being and
appearing” is used to define what is “exactly the problem of drawing” (Badiou, 2014 76,
77).  Instead  of  teasing  out  the  complexities  of  Stevens’s  poem,  however,  Badiou’s
philosophical attention instantly veers toward the familiar dialectic between presence
and absence, steered in this case toward “the fundamental fragility of drawing” and a
kind of Deleuzian “disjunctive synthesis” enacted and embodied by the art of drawing
(2014 77).
17 The extent to which we might gain insight into “Description Without Place” as a poem
remains uncertain when Badiou returns to it and calls Stevens “a critic of two historical
definitions of beauty and art” (2014 77). He notices that Stevens at one point in the text
offers the following epigram: “Description is / Composed of a sight indifferent to the
eye” (Stevens, 1997 300). Badiou connects this to the Platonic idea that “real beauty is
always beyond appearances,” and then dismisses the entire lineage by saying, “Stevens
does not agree, and I do not agree either” (2014 77). In a similar gesture, he detects
traces of the Romantic idea that “beauty is the sensitive form of the Idea” (2014 78) in
Stevens’s claim, elsewhere in the poem, that “description is revelation” (Stevens, 1997
301).  But  he  is  equally  dismissive  of  that  manner  of  thinking:  the  poem  itself
supposedly shows that “this  is  not the case” (2014 78),  because the work of  art,  in
Stevens’s words, “is not / The thing described” (Stevens, 1997 301). To an experienced
reader of Stevens criticism, such proclamations may come across as rather unhelpful,
for two reasons.  First,  Badiou limits himself  to cherry-picking brief,  philosophically
sounding aphorisms that are largely of a declarative, abstract, and nonfigurative sort,
without looking at how this language interacts with the surrounding imagery, formal
features,  and  linguistic  inventions  of  the  poem.  And  second,  he  extracts  these
statements from their immediate context, treating them as if they contributed toward
a  single  philosophical  argument  in  the  text,  rather  than  as  participating  in  those
ambulatory,  open-ended  movements  of  consciousness  pointed  out  by  Baker  and
Koethe. It is worth keeping this objection in mind, because we will see how Peter Hare
makes it crucial to his own philosophical approach.
18 Badiou, meanwhile, engages in further system-building, returning to Stevens one more
time to illustrate his own basic “theory of a work of art as a point where appearing and
being  are  indiscernible.”  For  this  illustration,  he  turns  to  “The  Man with  the  Blue
Guitar.” Badiou appreciates Stevens’s variations on the image of a blue guitar especially
because they offer, within “the artificial world created in language by Stevens […] a
poetical intensity in which being and existence are identical” (2014 80). This he then
“transfer[s] […] to the experience of drawing,” which likewise constitutes “a new way
of existing for the true being of the thing.” Yet if such discourse on the “true being” of
artistically created things may be ontologically more essentialist than Stevens’s poetics
tends to support, readers are still in for a last surprise: on his final page, Badiou pivots
to address a topic that has been absent altogether from his definitional exercise, or
from his use of Stevens. The primacy of the political seems to assert itself when Badiou
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raises the “relationship between drawing and politics,” and proclaims that traditional
“revolutionary politics […] is a description with places,” whereas the time has come to
“create a new trend of politics”—a “purely displaced politics, with absolute equality as
its fundamental concept” (2014 81). This language of purities and absolutes is notably
un-Stevensian again, and Badiou’s elliptical invocation of a new politics is not much
clarified by his subsequent call for an “international and nomadic creation with—as in a
work of art—a mixture of violence, abstraction and final peace” (2014 81-82). It is hard
to fathom where in the previous pages this utopian drive for final peace comes from,
although Badiou is able to anchor it once more in a few decontextualized lines from
Stevens—this time from the ending of “Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour,” in
which the poet proposes to “make a dwelling in the evening air[,] / In which being
[there] together is enough” (2014 82; Stevens, 1997 444).5 Badiou ends his essay with
what sounds like his previously unspoken agenda: “we may perhaps speak of a politics
of drawing” (2014 82). But whether or not one supports this politicization of the art of
drawing, readers interested in a better understanding of the philosophical qualities of
Stevens’s poetry are largely left to wonder how they are served by Badiou’s meditation
and his apparent insistence on the primacy of the political. Despite the essay’s subtitle,
“On Wallace Stevens,” it has not become clear what it is that Badiou as a philosopher
wants to say on the topic of Stevens as an inspiring poet. All he appears to have been
doing is to extract a few lines from the poet’s work, giving them a very specific spin to
serve Badiou’s own theoretical purposes.
 
Philosophers’ Reflections: The Case of Peter Hare
19 That  philosophical  approaches  toward  Stevens  may  differ  widely  becomes  obvious
when we finally  switch from Badiou to  Hare.  The name of  Peter  Hare may be less
familiar to a European readership. As an unassuming man (in the description of those
who knew him) he did not publish much. By contrast, he believed strongly in his role as
a facilitator—for instance, as longtime editor of the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce
Society,  a journal with an explicitly pluralistic stance toward American philosophical
traditions. For most of his career, Hare, who in his later years was married to Susan
Howe, taught in the philosophy department at  Buffalo in upstate New York.  As his
credentials indicate, he stands in the pragmatist tradition of Peirce and William James.
He died in 2008 and, seven years later, a selection of his writings was published under
the title Pragmatism with Purpose. The collection contains a section on poetry with three
essays in which Stevens figures, twice in a more subservient role, once as a central
topic.
20 The best way to present these materials here is again to follow the sequence in which
the  essays  are  reprinted,  starting  with  Hare’s  reflection  on  “What  Are  Poets  For?
Contextualism and Pragmatism.” The contrast with Badiou is instantly clear: whereas
the French thinker uses Stevens’s poetry to propose a general definition of the arts and,
particularly,  drawing,  Hare tends to reject  universalizing declarations about artistic
instrumentality.  He  contends  that  “any  context-neutral  account  of  the  nature  and
function of poetry is doomed either to be defeated by counter examples or to becoming
banal. And this banality cannot be avoided by a Wittgensteinian move in which the
competing forms and functions of poetry are said to share family resemblances.” To
Hare, “a context-neutral attempt to state the function of poetry”—or, in Badiou’s case,
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to define the art of drawing by drawing on a handful of decontextualized lines from
Stevens’s  verse—“is  as  pointless  as  a  context-neutral  effort  to  state  the function of
human hands” (2015 210). Attempts at general definition run the risk, furthermore, of
denying the specific language/media used by various arts. Hare gives the example of a
metaphysically  oriented  book  subtitled  On  the  Concept  of  Poetry.  He  agrees  with  a
colleague  who  deplored  how  all  the  beautiful  theorizing  in  this  book  failed  to
“illuminate  the  internal  dynamics  of  a  poem,  how  the  features  sound,  rhythm,
language, imagery and meaning develop in the poem” (Roland Garrett qtd. in Hare,
2015 210-11). This is an appropriate reminder not only coming after the example of
Badiou, who likewise does not acknowledge any of these aspects in Stevens’s poetry,
but also because the same lack of attention to form, style, and tone characterizes Simon
Critchley’s generally appreciative study of the poet, Things Merely Are: Philosophy in the
Poetry  of  Wallace  Stevens,  and,  finally,  because  attention  to  the  very  same elements
appeared to be the one major concern shared by the five poets covered in the first
section.
21 Hare’s second essay on poetry carries as a title “Misunderstandings between Poet and
Philosopher: Wallace Stevens and Paul Weiss.” Despite the historical nature of its case
study, this essay, too, invites application across the corpus of philosophical responses
to  Stevens,  for  Hare’s  story  revolves  around  the  poet’s  late  essay  “A  Collect  of
Philosophy,” which Critchley as a philosopher notably dismisses. Critchley regrets that
Stevens sometimes betrayed a rather impoverished conception of philosophy […].
This becomes particularly annoying in the 1951 lecture, “A Collect of Philosophy,”
where we are treated to unadorned extracts from Stevens’s correspondence with
Paul  Weiss,  Jean  Wahl  and  Jean  Paulhan and  half-digested  lumps  of  Rogers’s  A
Student’s History of Philosophy and Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity […]. Thin gruel
indeed! (2005 49)
True to his own word that we need to contextualize our understanding of the relations
between poetry  and philosophy,  Hare  digs  into  the  actual  historical  context  of  the
mutual misunderstandings between Stevens and the Yale philosopher Paul Weiss, who
rejected Stevens’s essay for publication in The Review of Metaphysics after having helped
the poet write it and originally having praised the results. Because Critchley is probably
unfamiliar with this background story, he merely repeats Weiss’s misunderstanding as
a philosopher. Hare, meanwhile, insists that “Stevens and Weiss failed to understand
one another despite each author’s deep respect for the other’s discipline,” and despite
Weiss’s “maverick” status in midcentury due to his interest in, among other things,
metaphysics and poetry (2015 216). There was, as Hare demonstrates, a lot of affinity
between Stevens and Weiss, as well as the best of intentions on either side—as there
continue to be, obviously, in Badiou’s and Critchley’s engagements with Stevens’s work.
22 Although  there  is  no  room  here  to  reproduce  the  details  of  the  story  that  Hare
reconstructs, it is worth signaling that Weiss, in an unpublished part of the interview
he gave much later to Peter Brazeau for Brazeau’s oral biography of the poet, regretted
his own failure to grasp the intentions and complexities of Stevens’s essay (2015 223).
For himself, Hare draws two rather surprising conclusions from his case study. The first
is that the “benefits of personal interaction between [a] poet and [a] philosopher are
[…] problematic”;  he talks of  “unhappy […] interactions” that “seldom” lead to any
“agree[ment] on the natures of their disciplines,” which in turn is “a serious barrier to
cooperation.”  These  are  surely  somewhat  unexpected  confessions,  coming  from  a
philosopher who was himself  married to  a  major  poet.  Hare’s  second conclusion is
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equally  unexpected:  he feels  that  encounters  such as  the one between Stevens and
Weiss, in spite of the many misunderstandings between the two men, demonstrate that
these encounters “can be stimulating and productive,” even if he fails to spell out how
and why (2015  224).  He  concludes  his  case  by  returning  one  more  time to  Weiss’s
retrospective  assessment  of  Stevens’s  value  as  a  phenomenological  thinker—an
assessment that happens to be very much in line with Critchley’s argument in Things
Merely  Are.  To  make  his  point,  Weiss  turned  to  the  same  opening  lines  from
“Description  Without  Place”  whose  appeal  on  Badiou  we  already  witnessed:  “It  is
possible that to seem—it is to be, / As the sun is something seeming and it is” (Stevens,
1997 296). Indeed, in Hare’s comments following this citation, the name of Weiss might
well  be  replaced  by  that  of  Badiou.  As  Hare  notes,  “Weiss  found  that  these  lines
expressed something ‘very close’ to what he was thinking. But he immediately adds—
note  the  cherry-picking—that  there  are  other  parts  of  the  poem  ‘which  seem  to
indicate something quite different from what I intend […]. And this I would say is an
error’” (2015 225).  Here we encounter the same cherry-picking at  work in Badiou’s
reflections on Stevens’s poem, and then the same dismissal of seemingly contradictory
statements  elsewhere  in  the  text,  apparently  because  internal  contradictions  by
definition need to be resolved through reasoning.
23 This recurrent manner of dealing with Stevens’s poetry by philosophers such as Weiss
and  Badiou  is  one  that  Hare  goes  on  to  criticize  in  his  third  and  final  Stevens-
mentioning essay, “Deep Conceptual Play in William James.” There he returns briefly to
the misunderstandings between Stevens and Weiss to comment upon them in a manner
that arguably has wider relevance to philosophical appropriations of the poet. Hare
claims that “Weiss mistakenly assumes that a poet qua poet should—at least within a
single poem—espouse an epistemology that is both sound and self-consistent.” (2015
232) Against this, Hare proposes the more complex notion that
Stevens regarded each of the competing epistemologies as metaphorical structures. It
is  difficult  perhaps  for  those  of  us  whose  daily  bread  is  earned  by  grappling
earnestly with epistemological arguments to “get our minds around” the notion of
an epistemological theory as a metaphor, but I submit that this is not a difficult
notion for a poet with strong philosophical, especially epistemological interests, as
Wallace Stevens was. (2015 232)
If  we pursue this  line  of  thinking,  there  is  “no reason to  suppose  that  the  poet  is
committed to the truth of one of the epistemologies. After all, no one doubts that it is
appropriate to have more than one metaphor in a single poem” (2015 232). This is where
Hare moves closer again to Critchley’s appreciation of Stevens: he celebrates that “what
a poet does with concepts, using them as metaphors, can loosen the grip that a concept
has on the reader, including the philosophical reader” (2015 233). Hare then turns to
William James’s advocacy of “the power of playing with thought and language” (qtd. in
Hare,  2015 235)—what he further develops as the activity of  “deep play,” which he
connects, via Friedrich Schiller’s Spieltrieb, to Peirce’s notion of “musement” (2015 236,
240).  Such  deep  play  he  sees  as  lying  “at  the  intersection of  the  artistic,  the
philosophical, the religious, the mathematical, and the scientific” (2015 241). 
24 Of  the  seven  responses  to  Stevens’s  philosophical  importance  presented  in  my
overview, Hare’s thus appears to be the most productive one. It offers us a number of
practical  handles,  helpful  notions,  and a fitting larger framework.  It  reminds us,  in
particular, of several valuable principles: that we need to contextualize the question of
poetry’s relation to philosophy (and vice versa) if we want the answers to cut deep; that
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we may certainly appreciate Stevens as a phenomenological thinker provided we value
also the consciously contradictory nature of his lyric proclamations and do not reduce
his ideas to cherry-picked one-liners; that all along we need to understand the “deep
play”  with  thought  and  language  in  which  Stevens’s  verse  engages;  and  that  this
implies an understanding of how epistemologies may serve a metaphoric rather than a
conceptual function. To be sure, Hare does not try his hand at reading any particular
Stevens poem and what he offers is still limited to a set of principles and analytical
tools. In the end, it remains for the literary critic to set these principles and tools to
work in particular readings.
 
Conclusion
25 The final example of Hare’s writings serves as an excellent reminder of the need to be
wary of decontextualized extrapolations from the concrete to the general, especially
when we are  dealing  with  the  conjunction  of  poetry  and philosophy,  two types  of
writing that tend to set the concrete and general to such different uses. By pitting the
voices  of  poets  against  those  of  philosophers,  the  preceding  survey  has  sought  to
dramatize some of the difficulties typically confronted by poets and philosophers when
they seek to find common ground between their respective genres. My case study has
allowed the reader to observe directly, on empirical grounds, how poets often remain
wary of  addressing Stevens’s  philosophical  weight  except  by noting how the poet’s
mental  activity  is  formally  and  stylistically  enacted  in  his  verse,  while  several
philosophers  who  are  attracted  to  Stevens’s  writings  (from  Weiss  to  Badiou  and
Critchley) fail to acknowledge the intrinsic nature of lyric thinking, and thus do not
always manage to contribute to a deeper understanding of the poetry as such. If Hare
builds an exception, he does so in a notably diffident and unassuming manner, taking
his  time  to  gather  contextual  evidence  and  merely  preparing  the  ground  for  the
philosophically minded reader to encounter Stevens’s poetry again in all of its wish to
“resist the intelligence almost successfully” (Stevens, 1997 910).
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NOTES
1. Apart from the three chapters by Eeckhout, Malkin, and Ziarek, readers with an interest in
recent philosophically and theoretically inspired responses to Stevens’s work are advised to turn
to Altieri, 2013; Bartczak and Mácha, 2018; Critchley, 2005; Eyers, 2016; Goldfarb, 2011; Goldstone,
2013; Han, 2019; Kostova, 2011; Kotin, 2015; Lehman, 2013; Miller, 2016; Popova, 2016; Ragg, 2010;
Richardson, 2018; Tompsett, 2012; and Wolfe, 2020.
2. Howe has composed both a series of poems in response to Stevens, “118 Westerly Terrace”
(included in Souls of the Labadie Tract), and a long two-part essay, “Vagrancy in the Park,” that
leads off  her  collection of  essays The Quarry (see,  respectively,  Howe,  2007 and Howe,  2015).
Swensen is the author of an extended meditation on Stevens in a hybrid genre that consists of
prose transforming occasionally into poetry (see Swensen, 2019).
3. The title plays on “The palm at the end of the mind,” the opening line of Stevens’s supposedly
last poem, “Of Mere Being” (Stevens, 1997 476). Its playful reversal, we might immediately note,
is more typical of poets’ than of philosophers’ responses to Stevens.
4. This is the designation used in the brief,  unattributed editorial preface that sits on top of
Baker’s opening essay (2016 24).
5. The punctuation and word in square brackets are in Stevens’s poem but missing from Badiou’s
citation.
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  investigates  how  the  relation  between  poetry  and  philosophy  is  developed  in  a
sample of  reflections on the philosophical  qualities  of  the American Modernist  poet  Wallace
Stevens’s work. It offers a critical presentation of a handful of twenty-first-century published
responses  to  Stevens’s  poetry  emanating  from  two  different  quarters:  fellow  poets  and
philosophers.  The  five  selected  poets  (David  Baker,  Linda  Gregerson,  Carl  Phillips, Stanley
Plumly, and Carol Frost) collectively pondered Stevens’s philosophical qualities in a recent issue
of the New England Review, while the responses by philosophers Alain Badiou and Peter Hare were
published  in  collections  of  their  essays.  The  two  different  angles  are  investigated  precisely
because they fall outside mainstream literary criticism on Stevens and help to dramatize several
of  the difficulties  confronted by poets and philosophers seeking to find common ground.  By
pitting the voices of poets against those of philosophers, the article allows the reader to observe
empirically how poets are often wary of addressing Stevens’s philosophical weight except by
noting the formal and stylistic enactment of mental activity in his verse,  while philosophers
sometimes fail  to acknowledge the intrinsic nature of lyric thinking, and thus do not always
manage to contribute to a deeper understanding of the poetry as such.
Cet article s’interroge sur la manière dont la relation entre poésie et philosophie se développe
dans certaines réflexions sur la portée philosophique de l’œuvre du poète moderniste américain
Wallace Stevens. Il dresse le portrait critique de certaines réponses proposées au vingt-et-unième
siècle à la poésie de Stevens, qui proviennent de champs différents : poésie d’un côté, philosophie
de l’autre. Les cinq poètes choisis dans le cadre de cette étude (David Baker, Linda Gregerson,
Carl  Phillips,  Stanley  Plumly,  et  Carol  Frost)  se  sont  collectivement  penchés  sur  les  ressorts
philosophiques  de  Stevens  dans  un  numéro  récent  de  la  New  England  Review,  tandis  que  les
réponses apportées par les philosophes Alain Badiou et Peter Hare ont été publiées dans des
ouvrages recueillant  certains de leurs essais.  Nous choisissons de nous intéresser à  ces  deux
approches précisément dans la mesure où la critique littéraire dominante sur l’œuvre de Stevens
tend à les ignorer, mais aussi parce qu’elles permettent de dramatiser plusieurs des difficultés
auxquelles  font  face  poètes  et  philosophes  à  la  recherche  d’un  terrain  d’entente.  Or  en
confrontant la voix de poètes à celle de philosophes, cet article propose au lecteur d’observer de
manière empirique comment les poètes tendent à se méfier du poids philosophique de Stevens en
concentrant leurs efforts sur la façon dont l’activité mentale vient s’incarner formellement et
stylistiquement dans les vers du poète, alors que les philosophes ont de leur côté tendance à
ignorer la nature intrinsèquement lyrique de la pensée, ne parvenant pas, ce faisant, à proposer
une compréhension fine de la poésie en tant que telle.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Poésie moderniste américaine, Wallace Stevens, Alain Badiou, Peter Hare, Simon
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